VK Video is an internet video hosting service launched by VK (formerly known as Mail.ru Group) in 2021. It is positioned as a Russian alternative to the international platform YouTube. == History == The "VK Video" service began operations on October 15, 2021, following the merger of video platforms belonging to the social networks "VKontakte" and "Odnoklassniki". The launch of "VK Video" was managed by a team of executives led by VKontakte CEO Marina Krasnova, who worked at the company until 2023. Its launch was intended as an alternative to the international platform YouTube, which Russian authorities sought to replace with "domestic analogs. Key differences of the Russian service became the presence of pirated materials. Videos from the American video hosting site were uploaded en masse to "VK Video," which even caused the service to be temporarily blocked by YouTube. From 2022, to attract users, VKontakte's management bet on working with famous bloggers, specifically purchasing the shows "What Happened Next?" (ChBD) and "Vnutri Lapenko". Among the bloggers recruited to promote the service was the popular video blogger Vlad A4. An additional advantage for creators was the availability of monetization, which had been unavailable on YouTube for users from the Russian Federation since 2022. In September 2023, a separate "VK Video" mobile app appeared. In total, by the end of 2023, the monthly audience of "VK Video" reached 67.9 million users (which is almost 30 million less than YouTube). In the summer of 2024, following the blocking of YouTube in Russia, the service's traffic grew sharply: in August, its audience increased by more than two times compared to July. In the same month, "VK Video" took second place in downloads among free apps in the App Store and third in Google Play. In December 2024, the service received its own domain: vkvideo.ru. For the first time, "VK Video" managed to surpass YouTube in monthly audience in Russia in July 2025: the Russian service attracted 76.4 million viewers, whereas YouTube's reach amounted to 74.9 million people. == Platform features == On "VK Video," a view is recorded from the first second, whereas on YouTube it is only from the thirtieth. At the same time, a significant portion of comments are left by bots. For videos from the platform's most popular bloggers, the engagement level (likes to views) does not reach 4%. The "Trends" section most often features videos from large channels where the ratio of likes to views does not exceed 2%. == Management == In April 2025, the post of General Director of "VK Video" was taken by Marianna Maksimovskaya. From June 2022 to July 2024, the development of the platform was led by Fyodor Yezhov, who was primarily responsible for its technical direction. == Awards == In 2023, VK Video was awarded the Runet Prize in the "Science, Technology and Innovation" category.
Cloud Security Alliance
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) is a not-for-profit organization with the mission to "promote the use of best practices for providing security assurance within cloud computing, artificial intelligence and to provide education on the uses of cloud computing to help secure all other forms of computing." The CSA has over 80,000 individual members worldwide. The CSA gained significant reputability in 2011 when the American Presidential Administration selected the CSA Summit as the venue for announcing the federal government’s cloud computing strategy. == History == The CSA was formed in December 2008 as a coalition by individuals who saw the need to provide objective enterprise user guidance on the adoption and use of cloud computing. Its initial work product, Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing, was put together in a Wiki-style by dozens of volunteers. In 2014, the Chairman of the Board of the CSA was Dave Cullinane, VP of Global Security and Privacy for Catalina Marketing, St. Petersburg, Florida, and former CISO for eBay. Cullinane has said, "If you have an application exposed to the Internet that will allow people to make money, it will be probed." == Profile == In 2009, the Cloud Security Alliance incorporated in Nevada as a Corporation and achieved US Federal 501(c)6 non-profit status. It is registered as a Foreign Non-Profit Corporation in Washington. == Policy maker support == The CSA works to support a number of global policy makers in their focus on cloud security initiatives including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), European Commission, Singapore Government, and other data protection authorities. In March 2012, the CSA was selected to partner with three of Europe’s largest research centers (CERN, EMBL and ESA) to launch Helix Nebula – The Science Cloud. == Size == The Cloud Security Alliance employs roughly sixty full-time and contract staff worldwide. It has several thousand active volunteers participating in research, working groups and chapters at any time. == Membership == According to CSA, they are a member-driven organization, chartered with promoting the use of best practices for providing security assurance within Cloud Computing, and providing education on the uses of Cloud Computing to help secure all other forms of computing. === Individuals === Individuals who are interested in cloud computing and have experience to assist in making it more secure receive a complimentary individual membership based on a minimum level of participation. === Chapters === The Cloud Security Alliance has a network of chapters worldwide. Chapters are separate legal entities from the Cloud Security Alliance, but operate within guidelines set down by the Cloud Security Alliance In the United States, Chapters may elect to benefit from the non-profit tax shield that the Cloud Security Alliance has. Chapters are encouraged to hold local meetings and participate in areas of research. Chapter activities are coordinated by the Cloud Security Alliance worldwide. === International scope === There are separate legal entities in Europe and Asia Pacific, called Cloud Security Alliance (Europe), a Scottish company in the United Kingdom, and Cloud Security Alliance Asia Pacific Ltd, in Singapore. Each legal entity is responsible for overseeing all Cloud Security Alliance-related activities in their respective regions. These legal entities operate under an agreement with Cloud Security Alliance that give it oversight power and have separate Boards of Directors. Both are companies Limited By Guarantee. The Managing Directors of each are members of the Executive Team of Cloud Security Alliance. == Areas of research == The Cloud Security Alliance has 25+ active working groups. Key areas of research include cloud standards, certification, education and training, guidance and tools, global reach, and driving innovation. Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing. Foundational best practices for securing cloud computing. Top Threats to Cloud Computing. Helps organizations make educated risk management decisions regarding their cloud adoption strategies. GRC (Governance, Risk and Compliance) Stack. A toolkit for key stakeholders to instrument and assess clouds against industry established best practices, standards and critical compliance requirements. Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM). Security controls framework for cloud provider and cloud consumers. CloudTrust Protocol. The mechanism by which cloud service consumers ask for and receive information about the elements of transparency as applied to cloud service providers. Consensus Assessments Initiative Research. Tools and processes to perform consistent measurements of cloud providers. Software Defined Perimeter. A proposed security framework that can be deployed to protect application infrastructure from network-based attacks. It will incorporate standards from organizations such as OASIS and NIST and security concepts from organizations like the U.S. DoD into an integrated framework. == Working groups and initiatives == Mobile Working Group Big Data Working Group Security as a Service Working Group Trusted Cloud Initiative CloudAudit CloudCERT CloudSIRT Cloud Metrics Security, Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) Cloud Data Governance Turbot (business) Blockchain/Distributed Ledger
Self-supervised learning
Self-supervised learning (SSL) is a paradigm in machine learning where a model is trained on a task using the data itself to generate supervisory signals, rather than relying on externally-provided labels. In the context of neural networks, self-supervised learning aims to leverage inherent structures or relationships within the input data to create meaningful training signals. SSL tasks are designed so that solving them requires capturing essential features or relationships in the data. The input data is typically augmented or transformed in a way that creates pairs of related samples, where one sample serves as the input, and the other is used to formulate the supervisory signal. This augmentation can involve introducing noise, cropping, rotation, or other transformations. Self-supervised learning more closely imitates the way humans learn to classify objects. During SSL, the model learns in two steps. First, the task is solved based on an auxiliary or pretext classification task using pseudo-labels, which help to initialize the model parameters. Next, the actual task is performed with supervised or unsupervised learning. Self-supervised learning has produced promising results in recent years, and has found practical application in fields such as audio processing, and is being used by Facebook and others for speech recognition. == Pseudo-labels == Pseudo-labels are automatically generated labels that a model assigns to unlabeled data based on its own predictions. They are widely used in self-supervised and semi-supervised learning, where ground-truth annotations are limited or unavailable. By treating predicted labels as surrogate ground truth, learning algorithms can make use of large quantities of unlabeled data in the training process. Pseudo-labeling also plays an important role in systems that must adapt to concept drift, where the statistical properties of the data change over time. In these scenarios, the model may detect that an incoming instance deviates from previously learned behavior. The system then generates a classification result for that instance, and this predicted class is used as a pseudo-label for updating or retraining model components that are becoming outdated. This approach enables continuous adaptation in dynamic environments without requiring manual annotation. In many adaptive learning pipelines, pseudo-labels are chosen when the classifier produces sufficiently confident predictions, reducing the risk of propagating errors. These pseudo-labeled instances are then incorporated into training to refresh or evolve the model's understanding of emerging data patterns, particularly when existing components show signs of “aging” due to drift or distributional shifts. This strategy reduces reliance on manual labeling while helping maintain long-term model performance. == Types == === Autoassociative self-supervised learning === Autoassociative self-supervised learning is a specific category of self-supervised learning where a neural network is trained to reproduce or reconstruct its own input data. In other words, the model is tasked with learning a representation of the data that captures its essential features or structure, allowing it to regenerate the original input. The term "autoassociative" comes from the fact that the model is essentially associating the input data with itself. This is often achieved using autoencoders, which are a type of neural network architecture used for representation learning. Autoencoders consist of an encoder network that maps the input data to a lower-dimensional representation (latent space), and a decoder network that reconstructs the input from this representation. The training process involves presenting the model with input data and requiring it to reconstruct the same data as closely as possible. The loss function used during training typically penalizes the difference between the original input and the reconstructed output (e.g. mean squared error). By minimizing this reconstruction error, the autoencoder learns a meaningful representation of the data in its latent space. === Contrastive self-supervised learning === For a binary classification task, training data can be divided into positive examples and negative examples. Positive examples are those that match the target. For example, if training a classifier to identify birds, the positive training data would include images that contain birds. Negative examples would be images that do not. Contrastive self-supervised learning uses both positive and negative examples. The loss function in contrastive learning is used to minimize the distance between positive sample pairs, while maximizing the distance between negative sample pairs. An early example uses a pair of 1-dimensional convolutional neural networks to process a pair of images and maximize their agreement. Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) allows joint pretraining of a text encoder and an image encoder, such that a matching image-text pair have image encoding vector and text encoding vector that span a small angle (having a large cosine similarity). InfoNCE (Noise-Contrastive Estimation) is a method to optimize two models jointly, based on Noise Contrastive Estimation (NCE). Given a set X = { x 1 , … x N } {\displaystyle X=\left\{x_{1},\ldots x_{N}\right\}} of N {\displaystyle N} random samples containing one positive sample from p ( x t + k ∣ c t ) {\displaystyle p\left(x_{t+k}\mid c_{t}\right)} and N − 1 {\displaystyle N-1} negative samples from the 'proposal' distribution p ( x t + k ) {\displaystyle p\left(x_{t+k}\right)} , it minimizes the following loss function: L N = − E X [ log f k ( x t + k , c t ) ∑ x j ∈ X f k ( x j , c t ) ] {\displaystyle {\mathcal {L}}_{\mathrm {N} }=-\mathbb {E} _{X}\left[\log {\frac {f_{k}\left(x_{t+k},c_{t}\right)}{\sum _{x_{j}\in X}f_{k}\left(x_{j},c_{t}\right)}}\right]} === Non-contrastive self-supervised learning === Non-contrastive self-supervised learning (NCSSL) uses only positive examples. Counterintuitively, NCSSL converges on a useful local minimum rather than reaching a trivial solution, with zero loss. For the example of binary classification, it would trivially learn to classify each example as positive. Effective NCSSL requires an extra predictor on the online side that does not back-propagate on the target side. === Joint-Embedding and Predictive Architectures === A major class of self-supervised learning moves beyond contrastive pairs, instead maximizing the agreement between views while preventing collapse through statistical constraints. Rooted in Deep Canonical Correlation Analysis (Deep CCA), this approach includes Joint-Embedding Architectures (JEA) like Barlow Twins and VICReg, which enforce covariance constraints to learn invariant representations without negative sampling. Deep Latent Variable Path Modelling (DLVPM) generalizes this to multimodal systems, using path models to enforce correlation and orthogonality across diverse data types. In 2022 Yann LeCun introduced Joint-Embedding Predictive Architectures (JEPA) as a step towards decision making, reasoning, and autonomous human intelligence in machines, including self-improvement through autonomous learning. Founded in representation learning, LeCun included the concept of a “world model” in JEPA which aims to enable machines to replicate human intellect by providing machines with a concept for the world in which they exist. Unlike autoencoders, JEPAs operate entirely in latent space, avoiding pixel-level noise to focus on semantic structure. Rather than just learning invariance, JEPAs learn by predicting masked latent representations from visible context. JEPA has been applied to domains such as image analysis, audio processing, and motion in images and video. == Comparison with other forms of machine learning == SSL belongs to supervised learning methods insofar as the goal is to generate a classified output from the input. At the same time, however, it does not require the explicit use of labeled input-output pairs. Instead, correlations, metadata embedded in the data, or domain knowledge present in the input are implicitly and autonomously extracted from the data. These supervisory signals, extracted from the data, can then be used for training. SSL is similar to unsupervised learning in that it does not require labels in the sample data. Unlike unsupervised learning, however, learning is not done using inherent data structures. Semi-supervised learning combines supervised and unsupervised learning, requiring only a small portion of the learning data be labeled. In transfer learning, a model designed for one task is reused on a different task. Training an autoencoder intrinsically constitutes a self-supervised process, because the output pattern needs to become an optimal reconstruction of the input pattern itself. However, in current jargon, the term 'self-supervised' often refers to tasks based on a pretext-task training setup
Artificial intelligence and elections
As artificial intelligence (AI) has become more mainstream, there is growing concern about how this will influence elections. Potential targets of AI include election processes, election offices, election officials and election vendors. There are also global efforts to improve elections using AI. == Tactics == Generative AI capabilities allow creation of misleading content. Examples of this include text-to-video, deepfake videos, text-to-image, AI-altered images, text-to-speech, voice cloning, and text-to-text. In the context of an election, a deepfake video of a candidate may propagate information that the candidate does not endorse. Chatbots could spread misinformation related to election locations, times or voting methods. In contrast to malicious actors in the past, these techniques require little technical skill and can spread rapidly. LLM-generated messages have the capacity to persuade humans on political issues. Researchers have begun to investigate how people rate messages that LLMs generate for how persuasive they are. When it came to policy issues, the LLM-generated messages received a 2.91 compared to a 2.80 when it came to smartness between the AI and humans. The LLM-generated messages were often more technical and analytical than human-generated messages. Generative AI has been used to micro-target people during tight political elections. The generation of targeted large language models has triggered concern that they will be used to leverage readily scale microtargeting. Rephrasing inputs have been used to generate fraudulent emails and phishing websites. Rephrasing inputs in a microtargeting does not violate the terms of OpenAI usage. There are no safeguards to prevent the use of rephrasing and creation of fraudulent emails. Political campaign managers have access to this allowing for them to create targeted content. == Usage by country == === Argentina === ==== 2023 elections ==== During the 2023 Argentine primary elections, Javier Milei's team distributed AI generated images including a fabricated image of his rival Sergio Massa and drew 3 million views. The team also created an unofficial Instagram account entitled "AI for the Homeland." Sergio Massa's team also distributed AI generated images and videos. === Bangladesh === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the run up to the 2024 Bangladeshi general election, deepfake videos of female opposition politicians appeared. Rumin Farhana was pictured in a bikini while Nipun Ray was shown in a swimming pool. === Canada === ==== 2025 elections ==== In the run up to the 2025 Canadian federal election, the use of AI tools is likely to figure prominently. India, Pakistan and Iran are all expected to make efforts to subvert the national vote using disinformation campaigns to deceive voters and sway diaspora communities. In a report by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security called "Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process: 2025 Update", it states that malicious actors including China and Russia: "are most likely to use generative AI as a means of creating and spreading disinformation, designed to sow division among Canadians and push narratives conducive to the interests of foreign states". === France === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 French legislative election, deepfake videos appeared claiming: i) That they showed the family of Marine le Pen. In the videos, young women, supposedly Le Pen's nieces, are seen skiing, dancing and at the beach "while making fun of France’s racial minorities": However, the family members don't exist. On social media there were over 2 million views. ii) In a video seen on social media, a deepfake video of a France24 broadcast appeared to report that the Ukrainian leadership had "tried to lure French president Emmanuel Macron to Ukraine to assassinate him and then blame his death on Russia". === Ghana === ==== 2024 elections ==== During the months before the December 2024 Ghanaian general election, a network of at least 171 fake accounts has been used to spam social media. Posts have been used by a group identified as "@TheTPatriots" to promote the New Patriotic Party, although it is not known whether the two are connected. All the networks' posts were "highly likely" to have been generated by ChatGPT and appear to be the "first secretly partisan network using AI to influence elections in Ghana". The opposition National Democratic Congress was also criticized with its leader John Mahama being called a drunkard. === India === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 Indian general election, politicians used deepfakes in their campaign materials. These deepfakes included politicians who had died prior to the election. Mathuvel Karunanidhi's party posted with his likeness even though he had died 2018. A video The All-India Anna Dravidian Progressive Federation party posted showed an audio clip of Jayaram Jayalalithaa even though she had died in 2016. The Deepfakes Analysis Unit (DAU) is an open source platform created in March 2024 for the public to share misleading content and assess if it had been AI-generated. AI was also used to translate political speeches in real time. This translating ability was widely used to reach more voters. === Indonesia === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, Prabowo Subianto made extensive use of AI-generated art in his campaign, which ranged from images of himself as an adorable child to various child portrayals in his advertisements. The Indonesian Children's Protection Commission condemned these ads, labeling them as a form of misuse. Other candidates, Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, also incorporated AI art into their campaigns. Throughout the election period, all presidential candidates faced attacks from deepfakes, both in video and audio formats. === Ireland === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the last weeks of the 2024 Irish general election a spoof election poster appeared in Dublin featuring "an AI-generated candidate with three arms". The candidate is called Aidan Irwin, but no-one stood in the election with that name. A slogan on the poster says "put matters into artificial intelligence’s hands". The convincing election poster shows a man that "has six fingers on one hand, three arms, and a distorted thumb". === New Zealand === ==== 2023 elections ==== In May 2023, ahead of the 2023 New Zealand general election in October 2023, the New Zealand National Party published a "series of AI-generated political advertisements" on its Instagram account. After confirming that the images were faked, a party spokesperson said that it was "an innovative way to drive our social media". === Pakistan === ==== 2024 elections ==== AI has been used by the imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan and his media team in the 2024 Pakistani general election: i) An AI generated audio of his voice was added to a video clip and was broadcast at a virtual rally. ii) An op-ed in The Economist written by Khan was later claimed by himself to have been written by AI which was later denied by his team. The article was liked and shared on social media by thousands of users. === South Africa === ==== 2024 elections ==== In the 2024 South African general election, there were several uses of AI content: i) A deepfaked video of Joe Biden emerged on social media showing him saying that "The U.S. would place sanctions on SA and declare it an enemy state if the African National Congress (ANC) won". ii) In a deepfake video, Donald Trump was shown endorsing the uMkhonto weSizwe party. It was posted to social media and was viewed more than 158,000 times. iii) Less than 3 months before the elections, a deepfake video showed U.S. rapper Eminem endorsing the Economic Freedom Fighters party while criticizing the ANC. The deepfake was viewed on social media more than 173,000 times. === South Korea === ==== 2022 elections ==== In the 2022 South Korean presidential election, a committee for one presidential candidate Yoon Suk Yeol released an AI avatar 'Al Yoon Seok-yeol' that would campaign in places the candidate could not go. The other presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung introduced a chatbot that provided information about the candidate's pledges. ==== 2024 elections ==== Deepfakes were used to spread misinformation before the 2024 South Korean legislative election with one source reporting 129 deepfake violations of election laws within a two week period. Seoul hosted the 2024 Summit for Democracy, a virtual gathering of world leaders initiated by US President Joe Biden in 2021. The focus of the summit was on digital threats to democracy including artificial intelligence and deepfakes. === Taiwan === ==== 2024 elections ==== AI-generated content was used during the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. Among the media were: i) A deepfake video of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping which showed him supporting the presidential elections. Created on social media, the video was "widely circulated
AI Mode
AI Mode is a search feature used within Google Search. In March 2025, Google introduced an experimental "AI Mode" within its search platform, enabling users to input complex, multi-part queries and receive comprehensive, AI-generated responses. This feature uses Google's Gemini model, which enhances the system's reasoning capabilities and supports multimodal inputs, including text, images, and voice. Users need to be signed in to be able to use the image generation features. Initially, AI Mode was available to Google One AI Premium subscribers in the United States, who could access it through the Search Labs platform. This phased rollout allowed Google to gather user feedback and refine the feature before a broader release.
Wetware (brain)
Wetware is a term drawn from the computer-related idea of hardware or software, but applied to biological life forms. == Usage == The prefix "wet" is a reference to the water found in living creatures. Wetware is used to describe the elements equivalent to hardware and software found in a person, especially the central nervous system (CNS) and the human mind. The term wetware finds use in works of fiction, in scholarly publications and in popularizations. The "hardware" component of wetware concerns the bioelectric and biochemical properties of the CNS, specifically the brain. If the sequence of impulses traveling across the various neurons are thought of symbolically as software, then the physical neurons would be the hardware. The amalgamated interaction of this software and hardware is manifested through continuously changing physical connections, and chemical and electrical influences that spread across the body. The process by which the mind and brain interact to produce the collection of experiences that we define as self-awareness is in question. == History == Although the exact definition has shifted over time, the term Wetware and its fundamental reference to "the physical mind" has been around at least since the mid-1950s. Mostly used in relatively obscure articles and papers, it was not until the heyday of cyberpunk, however, that the term found broad adoption. Among the first uses of the term in popular culture was the Bruce Sterling novel Schismatrix (1985) and the Michael Swanwick novel Vacuum Flowers (1987). Rudy Rucker references the term in a number of books, including one entitled Wetware (1988): ... all sparks and tastes and tangles, all its stimulus/response patterns – the whole bio-cybernetic software of mind. Rucker did not use the word to simply mean a brain, nor in the human-resources sense of employees. He used wetware to stand for the data found in any biological system, analogous perhaps to the firmware that is found in a ROM chip. In Rucker's sense, a seed, a plant graft, an embryo, or a biological virus are all wetware. DNA, the immune system, and the evolved neural architecture of the brain are further examples of wetware in this sense. Rucker describes his conception in a 1992 compendium The Mondo 2000 User's Guide to the New Edge, which he quotes in a 2007 blog entry. Early cyber-guru Arthur Kroker used the term in his blog. With the term getting traction in trendsetting publications, it became a buzzword in the early 1990s. In 1991, Dutch media theorist Geert Lovink organized the Wetware Convention in Amsterdam, which was supposed to be an antidote to the "out-of-body" experiments conducted in high-tech laboratories, such as experiments in virtual reality. Timothy Leary, in an appendix to Info-Psychology originally written in 1975–76 and published in 1989, used the term wetware, writing that "psychedelic neuro-transmitters were the hot new technology for booting-up the 'wetware' of the brain". Another common reference is: "Wetware has 7 plus or minus 2 temporary registers." The numerical allusion is to a classic 1957 article by George A. Miller, The magical number 7 plus or minus two: some limits in our capacity for processing information, which later gave way to Miller's law.
Right to explanation
In the regulation of algorithms, particularly artificial intelligence and its subfield of machine learning, a right to [an] explanation is a right to be given an explanation for an output of the algorithm. Such rights primarily refer to individual rights to be given an explanation for decisions that significantly affect an individual, particularly legally or financially. For example, a person who applies for a loan and is denied may ask for an explanation, which could be "Credit bureau X reports that you declared bankruptcy last year; this is the main factor in considering you too likely to default, and thus we will not give you the loan you applied for." Some such legal rights already exist, while the scope of a general "right to explanation" is a matter of ongoing debate. There have been arguments made that a "social right to explanation" is a crucial foundation for an information society, particularly as the institutions of that society will need to use digital technologies, artificial intelligence, machine learning. In other words, that the related automated decision making systems that use explainability would be more trustworthy and transparent. Without this right, which could be constituted both legally and through professional standards, the public will be left without much recourse to challenge the decisions of automated systems. == Examples == === Credit scoring in the United States === Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B of the Code of Federal Regulations), Title 12, Chapter X, Part 1002, §1002.9, creditors are required to notify applicants who are denied credit with specific reasons for the detail. As detailed in §1002.9(b)(2): (2) Statement of specific reasons. The statement of reasons for adverse action required by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse action. Statements that the adverse action was based on the creditor's internal standards or policies or that the applicant, joint applicant, or similar party failed to achieve a qualifying score on the creditor's credit scoring system are insufficient. The official interpretation of this section details what types of statements are acceptable. Creditors comply with this regulation by providing a list of reasons (generally at most 4, per interpretation of regulations), consisting of a numeric reason code (as identifier) and an associated explanation, identifying the main factors affecting a credit score. An example might be: 32: Balances on bankcard or revolving accounts too high compared to credit limits === European Union === The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, enacted 2016, taking effect 2018) extends the automated decision-making rights in the 1995 Data Protection Directive to provide a legally disputed form of a right to an explanation, stated as such in Recital 71: "[the data subject should have] the right ... to obtain an explanation of the decision reached". In full: The data subject should have the right not to be subject to a decision, which may include a measure, evaluating personal aspects relating to him or her which is based solely on automated processing and which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her, such as automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention. ... In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision. However, the extent to which the regulations themselves provide a "right to explanation" is heavily debated. There are two main strands of criticism. There are significant legal issues with the right as found in Article 22 — as recitals are not binding, and the right to an explanation is not mentioned in the binding articles of the text, having been removed during the legislative process. In addition, there are significant restrictions on the types of automated decisions that are covered — which must be both "solely" based on automated processing, and have legal or similarly significant effects — which significantly limits the range of automated systems and decisions to which the right would apply. In particular, the right is unlikely to apply in many of the cases of algorithmic controversy that have been picked up in the media. The UK has also recently amended its implementation of Article 22. A second potential source of such a right has been pointed to in Article 15, the "right of access by the data subject". This restates a similar provision from the 1995 Data Protection Directive, allowing the data subject access to "meaningful information about the logic involved" in the same significant, solely automated decision-making, found in Article 22. Yet this too suffers from alleged challenges that relate to the timing of when this right can be drawn upon, as well as practical challenges that mean it may not be binding in many cases of public concern. Other EU legislative instruments contain explanation rights. The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act provides in Article 86 a "[r]ight to explanation of individual decision-making" of certain high risk systems which produce significant, adverse effects to an individual's health, safety or fundamental rights. The right provides for "clear and meaningful explanations of the role of the AI system in the decision-making procedure and the main elements of the decision taken", although only applies to the extent other law does not provide such a right. The Digital Services Act in Article 27, and the Platform to Business Regulation in Article 5, both contain rights to have the main parameters of certain recommender systems to be made clear, although these provisions have been criticised as not matching the way that such systems work. The Platform Work Directive, which provides for regulation of automation in gig economy work as an extension of data protection law, further contains explanation provisions in Article 11, using the specific language of "explanation" in a binding article rather than a recital as is the case in the GDPR. Scholars note that remains uncertainty as to whether these provisions imply sufficiently tailored explanation in practice which will need to be resolved by courts. === France === In France the 2016 Loi pour une République numérique (Digital Republic Act or loi numérique) amends the country's administrative code to introduce a new provision for the explanation of decisions made by public sector bodies about individuals. It notes that where there is "a decision taken on the basis of an algorithmic treatment", the rules that define that treatment and its "principal characteristics" must be communicated to the citizen upon request, where there is not an exclusion (e.g. for national security or defence). These should include the following: the degree and the mode of contribution of the algorithmic processing to the decision- making; the data processed and its source; the treatment parameters, and where appropriate, their weighting, applied to the situation of the person concerned; the operations carried out by the treatment. Scholars have noted that this right, while limited to administrative decisions, goes beyond the GDPR right to explicitly apply to decision support rather than decisions "solely" based on automated processing, as well as provides a framework for explaining specific decisions. Indeed, the GDPR automated decision-making rights in the European Union, one of the places a "right to an explanation" has been sought within, find their origins in French law in the late 1970s. == Criticism == Some argue that a "right to explanation" is at best unnecessary, at worst harmful, and threatens to stifle innovation. Specific criticisms include: favoring human decisions over machine decisions, being redundant with existing laws, and focusing on process over outcome. Authors of study "Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For" Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale argue that a right to explanation is not the solution to harms caused to stakeholders by algorithmic decisions. They also state that the right of explanation in the GDPR is narrowly defined, and is not compatible with how modern machine learning technologies are being developed. With these limitations, defining transparency within the context of algorithmic accountability remains a problem. For example, providing the source code of algorithms may not be sufficient and may create other problems in terms of privacy disclosures and the gaming of technical systems. To mitigate this issue, Edwards and Veale argue that an auditing system could be more effective, to allow auditors to loo